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This study surveys the performance, cost, and schedule
trade-off process during the ship acquisition cycle, from
identification of the need to delivery of the ship. The
dialogue between the ship user and the ship producer to
develop the ship system requirements and translate the need
into a ship which meets the user's requirements is discussed.
The survey investigates the trade-off techniques used by
many of the individuals within the ship project offices of
the Naval Ships Systems Command. As a result of investigating
how these individuals attempt to optimize the variables of
performance, cost, and schedule, some conculsions are drawn
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The acquisition of ships for the Navy is a long, difficult,
and complex process. Major weapon system procurement policies
have undergone significant changes within the past few years.
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard formulated
many new policies which were promulgated by Department of
Defense Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition of Major Defense
Systems." Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, the former Chief of Naval
Operations, restructured the missions and priorities for ship
acquisitions. The developments in these two areas, naval
missions and procurement policy, during 1969 and 1970 required
reconsideration of recent ship procurement procedures to
overcome the recognized shortcomings of past approaches, and
respond to the new priorities of the revised missions and
procurement policies. The procurement approach and procedures
which have evolved are quite different from those of the 1960 's,
although they do attempt to imitate successful aspects of these
past procurements and reflect lessons learned.
A. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The principal objective of our research into the ship
acquisition process was to identify those features of programs
which may have significance for future programs, especially
in the area of cost, schedule and performance trade-off
decision making. Early in the research effort it became
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apparent that the bulk of the data on this subject would
have to come from interviews with the personnel within the
Navy who are involved in the ship acquisition process. It
would be necessary to discuss the ship acquisition process
with the personnel who are concerned with the process from
the identification of a need for a new ship through the
construction of that ship. Consequently, the authors made
two visits to Washington, D. C. to discuss the problems
inherent in many different ship acquisition programs and the
approaches and techniques that have been used to attempt to
solve the problem of making the optimum decision with respect
to trade-offs.
A trade-off is a means of analyzing the interrelation-
ships between various performance, cost and/or schediile
variables in order to obtain a balance among these variables
which maximizes cost-effectiveness. Thus, trade-offs are the
means of optimizing ship design by the personnel involved
in the ship acquisition process. Trade-offs are made
continually throughout the acquisition process, and it is
possible for a trade-off to be made within one, two or all
three of the cost, performance and/or schedule variables.
The research and analysis of the ship acquisition process
and trade-off decision making impacts required an investigation
into the identification of military needs that spawn the ship
requirement, the technical approaches used to satisfy the ship
requirement, and the approaches used to design, develop and
construct the ship. The implications of the new Department
14

of Defense and Navy procurement policies and requirements
on future Navy shipbuilding programs are also discussed.
While planning, directive and procurement documents and
correspondence were used during the investigation, a great
reliance was placed on data obtained by interview to complete
the research and analysis reported in the succeeding chapters.
B. CHAPTER OUTLINES
Chapter Two describes the ship acquisition life cycle,
how the ship programs are initiated, the periods and phases
of a ship acquisition process and the requirements of each
period and phase. The discussion points out the require-
ments for a continuing dialogue between the ship user, the
Chief of Naval Operations, and the ship producer, the Navy
Material Command through its Naval Ship Systems Command.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the magnitude
of the trade-off problem and the features of this problem
that must be considered when making the optimal trade-off
choice.
Chapter Three discusses in greater depth the dialogue
between the user and producer and the responsibilities of
each in the determination and development of ship system
requirements. The influences of the user are discussed,
from need identification to identification of desired
operational parameters required in the ship. The influences
of the producer are presented by discussing how the conceptual
design process is accomplished, essential ship system
parameters are identified, how the Ship Acquisition Project
15

Manager can mold all of the information derived from
various sources into a viable, produceable ship, and how
the project manager can manage the necessary changes in
his ship as the design and construction process progresses.
The discussion in Chapter Four centers on the trade-off
techniques and considerations given to cost, schedule and
performance. The influence of each of these dimensions of
the trade-off problem is discussed, and some of the tools
used by project managers and ship designers to resolve the
trade-off problem are indicated. Performance and some of
the operational parameters which affect performance are
discussed, along with some of the tools and techniques which
are available to analyze and measure performance. The
effect of cost, the problems in estimating cost and examples
of how cost and performance can be used to make trade-offs
are shown. The influence of schedule and the importance of
the ship acquisition time line are presented in the concluding
portion of the chapter.
Chapter Five discusses the conclusions and recommendations
of the authors with respect to: Conceptual Design and
Advanced Development Studies, Design and Development
Techniques, Construction Phase Impacts and the requirement
for developing a procedure to document Lessons Learned in
the Ship Acquisition process.
16

II. SHIP ACQUISITION CYCLE AND THE TRADE-OFF PROBLEM
A. SHIP ACQUISITION CYCLE
A ship, to be useful, must satisfy an operational need,
for Naval ships, such an operational need usually results
from a military threat. In addition, the ship must be able
to continue to meet the need over a specified long period
of time in order to justify the investment in time, money,
and effort. Thus, one must consider the life cycle of a ship
in a dynamic sense, the so-called "cradle-to-grave" view-
point. The ship life cycle may be said to originate upon the
recognition of its need and to terminate when the ship
is retired as obsolete.
A ship's life cycle may be originated in one of two ways,
as a result of a new threat or need resulting from a new
scientific or technological breakthrough, or as an iteration
of an existing ship which is no longer cost-effective and
whose life cycle is nearing completion (the so-called
"second generation"). The new generation ship, therefore,
can be expected to satisfy an increased need or perhaps the
original need in a more effective manner.
In the Navy, a ship's useful life is often considered to
be 20 to 30 years. Sometimes the anticipated life of a
ship is not effectively realized because provisions for
system growth to meet requirements are not incorporated
during original ship planning.
17

In the evolution of a ship's design, construction, and
employment , a number of phases exist between the two end-
points of the ship's life which, in turn, are subsets of
three distinct periods - the Planning Period, the Acquisition
Period, and the Use Period. Figure 2-1 indicates the
various phases and periods, along with the inputs and outputs
of each. (•*-)
B. USER-PRODUCER DIALOGUE
With some exceptions, ships that have been constructed
for the Navy have resulted from an interaction between users
and producers. In the Navy, the user is the Fleet and is
represented at headquarters by the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations (OPNAV). The user is concerned with stating
and developing the needs and concepts for the mission of the
ship and for its operation and support. He provides the input
requirements to the ship design. (^) With the assistance of
supporting organizations, new requirements (usually threats)
are analyzed and missions formulated. This leads to the
specification of requirements constrained by the availability
of resources, the environment and the technological state-
of-the-art. See Figure 2-2.
The producer must generate the design or performance
specifications so that the resultant Navy ship, when designed
and constructed, meets the requirements of the Fleet. Within
the Navy, the producer role is represented by the Naval
Material Command (NAVMAT) and its Systems Commands. For






















































































































NAVSHIPS and its internal functional elements are assisted
by Navy laboratories, other Navy organizations, and industry
in translating ship requirements to conceptual design models
that will meet the need and remain within the stipulated
cost and performance characteristics.
The interaction or dialogue between user and producer is
a complex iterative process. The dialogue must continue
throughout the acquisition cycle if a cost-effective ship
is to be designed and produced. Figure 2-3 depicts the formal
and informal lines of communication between the user and
producer. On the user side, under OPNAV, are supporting
analytical organizations, the Program Sponsor, and the Program
Coordinator. The Program Sponsor is the voice of the Fleet
in the user organization and insures that resources are
available for the program and remain available. The Program
Coordinator is the user's direct liaison contact with the
producer's Project Manager, and serves as the focal point
between the two organizations. The Program Coordinator
strives to maintain the visibility of the program within and
outside the Navy.
On the producer side, under the Chief of Naval Material
is NAVSHIPS and other Systems Commands which must be relied
upon for support in the ship acquisition. For example, the
Naval Ordnance Systems Command (NAVORD)* is responsible for
providing the ship with its weapons systems and the Naval
*As of 1 July 1974, NAVSHIPS and NAVORD were combined to
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Electronics Systems Command (NAVELEX) is responsible for
providing the ship with its communications system. The
Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) is the key decision
maker for the producer activities and the dialogue link to
the user side. He has the prime responsibility for developing
the technical requirements of the ship, and for ship design
and construction. The Naval Ships Engineering Center (NAVSEC)
is essentially the engineering department of NAVSHIPS and
is involved in the acquisition process from concept design
through modification during the use period. The other
supporting functional divisions of NAVSHIPS assist the Project
Manager by providing expertise in cost estimating, contracting,
production, logistics, and other business management functions.
Interviews conducted by the authors with Project Managers
and their staffs concerning the user-producer dialogue elicited
the general opinion that there were major shortcomings in the
way this process was actually being conducted. The consensus
was that, by default, NAVMAT rather than OPNAV was determining
the needs of the Fleet and that there was no formal documen-
tation of the ship definition process. In order to improve
the documentation of the user-producer dialogue with respect
to ships, a series of documents called a Top Level Requirement
(TLR), produced by the user, and a Top Level Specification
(TLS), the response by the producer, was recently instituted.
TLR/TLS is discussed in Section III A.
23

C. THE NATURE OF THE TRADE-OFF PROBLEM
The life cycle of any ship includes a continuing series
of management and technical compromises called trade-offs.
They commence during the early stages of the life cycle and
continue through engineering development, production,
deployment, maintenance, and modification until the ultimate
decision to replace the ship with one of higher performance
or improved cost-effectiveness is made. The principal
differences in these trade-offs concern the level at which
they are made as the acquisition process proceeds through the
life cycle. In the early stages, trade-offs are made at the
system level, while in the later stages of the cycle, trade-
offs are made at the component equipment level. Of all major
weapons systems, naval ships present the most complex problem
in achieving meaningful trade-off decisions. A naval ship
is a multi-functional system whose active life usually exceeds
the life span of contributing shipborne systems by a factor
of two or three. Thus, trade-offs and optimizations of design
cannot readily be done intuitively by the designers. Instead,
all technical and cost factors as well as development time
must be identified and defined, and the trade-off justified
and documented.
Trade-offs are used to obtain a practical balance between
cost, schedule and performance of systems. In this context,
cost includes all costs of acquisition and ownership;
performance includes all factors influencing effectiveness
in operational use, such as reliability and maintainability;
24

and the system includes all hardware and other required
items such as facilities, personnel, data, training, and
equipment.
The weighting factor or relative value assigned to the
worth of various system elements is subject to wide variation.
Depending on the particular program, technical risk, financial
or political considerations, or personnel ceilings may take
precedence at any given time. However, the fundamental
considerations are that the approved choice must be financially
acceptable, be technically feasible, have the required perform-
ance capability, be militarily useful, and be available in a
timely manner.
The fundamental considerations which affect the trade-off
problem are as follows:^ '
1. Risk
Risk may be defined as the measure of uncertainty
involved in meeting requirements or technical characteristics,
budgeted funding levels, or schedules. Whenever trade-off
studies are conducted, the degree of risk associated with
each alternative should be identified and assessed, and that
risk must be controlled.
Technical risks may appear when attempts are made to
introduce features which have not been successfully demon-
strated previously. Other causes of technical risk include
inadequate definition of operational performance objectives
(uncertainties in requirements) and insufficient test demon-
stration of equipment. Even though these and other risks
25

are minimized during development, there is always a chance
that, in the operational environment, performance requirements
will not be met, there will be reliability/maintainability
problems, and/or service approval could be denied.
2. Operational and Performance Factors
Operational and performance factors constitute prime
areas of consideration when making trade-offs. For example,
operational factors to be considered include the threat or
operational need which is the basis for determining the
mission and functional requirements, requirements for each
system in terms of the relationship to other systems, and
anticipated deployment considerations, such as the number of
installations and operational locations. With respect to ship
performance, trade-offs must be made keeping in mind the
minimum acceptable values of such operational parameters as
speed, range, endurance, and other essential aspects of ship
system performance. Consideration must also be given to the
functional capabilities of shipborne systems, subsystems, or
equipments that must be compared and evaluated against the
mission requirements comprising the performance envelope.
3. Physical, Functional, and Environmental Parameters
and Limits
Elements such as size, weight, facilities, and
service requirements require careful thought when trade-offs
are being considered. These include:
• Weights - weight limits and moment effect.
26

• Dimensions - size and shape, crew space, operator
station layout, and maintenance accessibility.
• Command and control - communication, computer base,
tactical data, navigation, and radar systems.
• Vulnerability factors of competing subsystems -
chemical, biological, radiological, electromagnetic radiation,




Considerations of reliability are of major concern
in system selection. Reliability for evaluation and comparison
between competing systems should be expressed in quantative
terms. To permit ready evaluation of the effect of trade-offs
at the subsystem or equipment level, system reliability should
be broken down into the reliability of the subsystem and
equipment components.
5. Maintainability
Assessment of maintainability for trade-off purposes
would include evaluation of such factors as:
• Level of maintenance required (ship's force,
tender, depot level).
• Ease of component or unit replacement.
• Commonality and interchangeability of units.
• Preventive maintenance requirements.
• Spare parts logistics.
6. Personnel Factors
Personnel factors include as assessment of each
competing system in the light of manning, skill level,
27

training and human engineering requirements or problems. This
estimate also provides an insight into relative system or
equipment complexity.
7. Facilities
Requirements for construction, purchase or development
of new facilities or modification of existing facilities to
support an alternative under consideration as a trade-off
possibility should be evaluated. These include advance base,




In the development of a ship system, the compatibility
of systems, subsystems, and equipment is of paramount import-
ance to ensure that no interfacing parameter is inadvertently
overlooked. Each trade-off analysis must include a separate
assessment of all factors which affect compatibility.
9. Standardization
The requirement for standardization acts as a
constraint on system design because it will influence the
trade-off decisions made during the design effort. Design
engineers must identify and exploit opportunities to use
interchangeable items for similar functions in order to





Safety must also be considered during trade-off
studies to assure the protection of individuals from injury
or death and to prevent damage to or loss of equipment or
property. Alternatives under consideration must satisfy
safety regulations and requirements such as fail-safe and
redundancy, and rescue and survival procedures.
The above considerations serve to emphasize the
complexity of the trade-off problem and expose its impact
on the ship acquisition process.
29

III. DEVELOPMENT OF SHIP SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
In this chapter specific areas which are the responsibility
of the user and the producer are discussed. The process of
requirement determination by the user and the methods used
by the producer to respond to these requirements are described.
A. TOP LEVEL REQUIREMENTS/TOP LEVEL SPECIFICATIONS
Beginning in the 1960 's, greater emphasis on life cycle
costing coupled with increasing complexities of ship require-
ments and weapons systems have emphasized the need for
improvement of the systematic, timely flow of supporting
decision-making documentation with which to control the ship
definition process. This has been accompanied by declining
fleet assets and escalating costs, tighter management control,
increased review by higher authority, and sharply increased
test and evaluation requirements related to operational
performance.
Historically, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV) initiated the user-producer dialogue by means of
"single sheet characteristics" to state requirements. The
"single sheet characteristics," contained information
relating to such requirements as speed, length, draft,
ordnance and electronic system capability, endurance and habit-
ability. The producer responded by means of a proposed
technical approach (PTA) and subsequently when an approach
30

was approved by OPNAV a technical development plan (TDP) was
written. The Top Level Requirements/Top Level Specifications
(TLR/TLS) concept, implemented in January 1974, replaces the
"single sheet characteristics," PTA, and TDP, and will be
used in the formulation of all new ship designs except
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines. It will include, where
practical, those current ship acquisitions which are in the
early phases of the ship acquisition life cycle.
When needs and mission requirements for a particular type
of ship have been defined, the program sponsor will initiate
the formal user-producer dialogue which leads to the establish-
ment of ship parameters and constraints, program initiation
and finally the design and construction of the ship. Initial
contact between OPNAV and NAVMAT will be between the existing
functional organizations. This is where the user-producer
dialogue begins. (4)
A user-producer working group composed of OPNAV and
NAVMAT personnel, plus other organizations as may be required,
will be formed to develop initial requirements. These
initial requirements will be used by NAVMAT to determine the
feasibility and cost of a ship which will potentially meet
the stated mission requirements. Although the initial
documents can be expected to contain undefined and incomplete
areas at this early stage of the ship acquisition life cycle,
they will permit the initiation of the design effort and
facilitate the rational, documented development of Information
on which to base trade-off decisions.
31

The alternatives developed by NAVMAT are presented to
OPNAV for review and decision. These decisions will then
lead to a further refinement of the requirements and further
design iterations. Effectiveness versus cost will be a
major trade-off criterion. At this early stage of develop-
ment, schedule is usually of lesser importance. A cost goal
will be established by CNO as early as possible for the
delivered cost of follow ships* in constant dollars of a
particular fiscal year. Unlike aircraft, which lend them-
selves to assembly line production, ships are constructed
like buildings, and the construction time for one ship is
measured in years. Because of this long time the development
and construction process results are not fully known until
the first ship has completed construction, test and evaluation.
Consequently, the cost of construction difficulties and design
changes are assigned to the first ship.
If it should develop at any stage of the design process
that the established requirements cannot be met within
constraint limits, the problem together with its limiting
constraints, alternative courses of action, and recommendations
for proposed changes are brought to the CNO for decision
and further direction. When the final characteristic decisions
are made, the requirements will be formalized and issued as
the TLR. (4)
* Follow ships are those ships which succeed the first
ship through the construction process.
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As an important part of the user-producer dialogue
established early in the conceptual phase, the development
of the Top Level Specifications by NAVMAT will proceed in
parallel with the development and refinement of the require-
ments. These specifications will indicate those portions of
the requirements which are being satisfied, and they will be
kept current with the requirements. Subsequent to the issue
of the TLR, the TLS will be finalized, approved and issued
by NAVMAT. (4) This document will provide a bridge between
the TLR and the ship procurement specifications. Figure 3-1
shows in block diagram format the relationship of TLR and TLS
preparation with the overall design effort. The definition
of specifications in parallel with the definition of require-
ments vastly improves the iteration process which in the
past had the specifications defined after the requirements
had been finalized. The past process was much less efficient
with respect to consumption of time and other resources.
The supporting documentation, which records ship require-
ments and program constraints, together with the trade-off
decisions and changes developed during the dialogue between
OPNAV and NAVMAT are an important part of the iterative process
This documentation becomes the TLR, and it will be maintained
current throughout the life of the ship. The documented
response to the TLR becomes the TLS, detailing the design



































































































































































































1. Threat, Mission, Age of the Fleet Analysis
As indicated in Section II A, the following are the
primary reasons that determine the need for new ships:
• To meet the new threats and operational needs
• To replace obsolete units
Threat and mission analysis determines what new or continuing
threats to the United States and/or allied countries must be
countered, and the most cost-effective means to meet these
threats. For example, the Destroyer Escort (DE) was developed
primarily to counter the enemy submarine threat against open
ocean convoys. The Aircraft Carrier (CV) was developed in
order to provide a mobile attack air strike capability against
enemy targets at sea or on land. Threat and mission analysis,
as applied to ships, should result in a conceptual idea of
what the ship will look like and what it will require to
perform as desired.
Obsolescence of current fleet units is predicted and
contained in the "Average Age of the Fleet" portion of the
entended planning annex to the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).
This annex shows when budget dollars will be required to
replace current ships by projecting ahead some eight to ten
years. When the time to begin acquisition of replacement
units is approached, an analysis is performed to determine
if the threat still exists and the mission still requires a
Navy asset to satisfy it. At the same time, a determination
can be made to ensure that a ship is the cost-effective
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alternative. (5) For example, when a large number of
minesweepers were decommissioned near the end of the Vietnam
War, the mission of minehunting was taken over by helicopters
with their dipping sonars and towed sweep equipment.
2. High-Low Mix Concept
During his first 60 days as Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), Admiral Zumwalt conducted a detailed study to assess
the Navy's strategic position for presentation to the
Secretaries of Defense and Navy. "Project Sixty," as it was
called, examined trends in international politics and economies,
world trade, sources of critical raw materials and defense
fiscal expectations. It also identified critical deficien-
cies which affected the balance of naval power between the
United States and Soviet Union. Resulting from "Project
Sixty" has been a massive modernization of Navy ships,
aircraft and weapons. This modernization has taken three
forms, one of which is the balanced high-low mix concept. As
applied to ships, this concept calls for a few multi-purpose
high-cost ships together with larger numbers of single-purpose
low-cost ships. (6) The single-purpose ship uses all of its
designed capability to maximize its probability of accomplish-
ing one mission. Multi-purpose ships sacrifice single-purpose
efficiency to be able to perform multi-purpose missions in the
most effective manner. *''
"Project Sixty" showed that sea control , the
maintenance of access to and use of worldwide sea lanes by
United States and allied commercial and military shipping,
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should be elevated to a major role and brought into better
balance with the strategic deterrence and strike missions
which had been predominant since the end of the Korean
Conflict
.
Between 1955 and 1970, the Navy's shipbuilding programs
had reflected the emphasis on strike and strategic deterrence
missions. The major portion of the Navy's shipbuilding
budget had gone toward the construction of complex, high-
cost nuclear submarines, conventional and nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers, and conventional and nuclear-powered
multi-purpose carrier escorts. Although some single-purpose
ships, such as Destroyer Escorts, had been constructed, the
bulk of the low-threat environment, non-carrier mission, such
as convoy escort and coastal patrol, was being accomplished
by World War II vintage ships. With the increased importance
of the sea control mission, there was clearly a need for new
ships to replace the older vessels in low-threat environment
duty.
Examination of this need indicated that large numbers
of these new ships would be required to provide adequate
coverage. Ideally, the ships' design should reflect the
projected nature of their roles in the 1980' s and beyond
rather than simply to duplicate, in more modern versions, the
obsolete capabilities of the World War II ships that they
would replace.
This definition of the need is only part of the
problem faced by the Chief of Naval Operations. The
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experience of the 1960's, the growing technical sophistication
of military weapon systems, and the inflationary trends of
the economy made it obvious that the cost of the required
number of fully capable technologically up-to-date, multi-
purpose ships would be prohibitive. To pursue this course
in an era of increasing unit costs and shrinking military
hardware acquisition budgets would require unacceptable
curtailment of other on-going programs.
In order to obtain the numbers of ships needed, the
Navy would build large numbers of ships of lesser capability,
not lesser quality, along with smaller numbers of full
capability ships. The high-low combination would provide a
fleet with the optimal overall mix of capabilities required
to meet the projected threat. The first program to implement
this philosophy was the Patrol Frigate (PF) as the destroyer
escort for amphibious or merchant convoys, this ship class
being near the low end of the mix. An example of a multi-
purpose ship is the Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG). This
ship is capable of performing carrier escort, anti-submarine
warfare (ASW), and anti-air warfare (AAW) missions.
The implementation of the high-low mix concept resulted
in a different approach to mission analysis. Cost has become
the driving factor in the development of low-mix, single-
purpose ships. Single-purpose (low mix) studies are being
accomplished in the submarine area. For instance, here the
use of a low-cost, possibly non-nuclear, submarine for
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barrier patrol missions is being investigated.^) The high-
low mix concept has set the stage for the ship requirements
of the 1980' s.
3. Platform Parameters and Constraints
Under the present system, with the Top Level
Requirements/Top Level Specifications concept not yet fully
implemented, OPNAV is still delivering to the technical
commands a set of parameter requirements (single sheet
characteristics) . These requirements are those items which
OPNAV feels are necessary for the ship to have in order to
fulfill the mission the ship is desired to accomplish. The
technical commands utilize those requirements to determine
whether they can conceptually design a ship with these desired
features and have it remain within predetermined cost
boundaries. As a general rule, the threshold values of the
following parameters are given to the technical commands for
their further work: ship speed, draft, length, and endurance.
These items are discussed in Section IV A. In addition, OPNAV
may specify propulsion type, number of propellers, habitability
requirements, ordnance, and electronic capability. In the
past few years, OPNAV has also specified a cost constraint.
Other less well defined operational parameters of the
ship, such as turning radius, acceleration, sea keeping, and
diving depth (for submarines) are resolved on a give and take
arrangement between the user and the producer. These initial
give and take decisions are some of the earliest trade-off
decisions made in the acquisition process. When the arm oi
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concern is about items such as stability or buoyancy, the
approach presented by the technical command is usually approved,





Normally, the first input by the technical commands
to the acquisition cycle of ships is made during the time
period when conceptual design studies are being accomplished.
Feasibility studies assist the ship user in determining the
ship system requirements to perform its assigned mission.
These studies develop trade-offs primarily between performance
and cost; since schedule is somewhat less important a factor
at this early phase. In addition to the absolute capability
of the ship and its cost, the marginal capabilities of the
ship systems and their costs are important to the trade-off
decision. Therefore, a large number of design concepts must
be studied. Design approximations are investigated since
absolute accuracy would be impractical at this point.
2. Synthesis Models
Synthesis models are used during the conceptual
design phase to explore a large number of design iterations
in order to converge on an approximately correct solution to
the user's problem. (9) These models can be used to develop
a series of consistent ship designs, since they are able to
methodically iterate the design each time the input parameters
are changed. The following methodology is used by NAVSEC
40

in the construction of the synthesis models it uses to
develop the initial conceptual designs. All NAVSEC models
contain the following general features:
a. Considerations Which Predetermine the Ship's
Geometry
In order to estimate the volume, weight, and
power requirements for a ship, it is necessary to know the
ship's geometric envelope. This envelope includes the
underwater hull, the hull from the design waterline to the
main deck, and the superstructure. It is also necessary to
explore major subsystem locations, e.g. propulsion machinery
aft, or amidships, because this will have an impact on
stability and center of gravity. General arrangement consid-
erations must also be included, since adequate space must
be provided to accept what is to be installed inside the
ship. Damage stability or watertight integrity must be
investigated to make the design capable of sustaining
battle damage and still remain afloat.
b. Design Strategy
In the models currently used, either of two
design strategies may be invoked. Each strategy starts by
assuming a certain number of specific ship parameter values,
e.g. length, draft, depth, displacement, center of gravity,
and architectural coefficients. Synthesis begins in the same
manner for each strategy by making calculations in a given
sequence. Once calculations are complete, they arc compared
to acceptable criteria. If the calculations differ from the
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acceptable criteria, then the selected design strategy is
invoked. In one strategy, a completely new combination of
specific values of the ship parameters is selected and
evaluated when the design is determined to be invalid. The
other design strategy performs design iterations by changing
some of the previously determined design parameters to
converge on a design which will meet acceptable criteria,
c. Cost Estimating Relationships
Cost estimating relationships (CER's) are derived
either explicitly or implicitly. An explicit CER is based on
cost data from older ships whose performance and physical
characteristics are similar to the ship being investigated.
Situations occur in which cost estimates are desired or
required, but the information necessary for explicit CERs is
unavailable. At such times highly subjective (ball park)
estimates are frequently used and can be justified as more
useful than no estimate at all. Such estimates are implicit
CERs, inasmuch as the estimator may be subconsciously
extrapolating from prior experience through the use of an
unformulated or vaguely conceived extrapolation to the new
item from older items. The CERs thus obtained can be used
to measure the total impact of the selection of certain
parameters, e.g. the weight of main propulsion machinery as
a function of shaft horsepower for twin and single screw
ships and the weight of main propulsion machinery as a
function of machinery foundation requirements. Through tin-
interaction of these CERs the requirement for the machinery
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foundation is able to be estimated from the shaft
horsepower.
d. Estimating the Physical Characteristics
One of the key elements in developing a synthesis
model is obtaining or attempting to fix at some level, or
within a narrow range, the physical characteristics of the
ship. Estimations must be made of the requirements for items
such as total kilowatts at 60 Hz, total kilowatts at 400 Hz,
gallons per minute of cooling water at a required temperature,
tons per hour of low pressure cooled air for air conditioning,
and gallons per day of distilled water. Not only must these
characteristics be fixed, but the correlations and interdepend-
encies among them must be considered. The correlation of the
various items that together make up the total requirements
is often accomplished by use of multiple regression analysis.
Two dangers arise however, the first of which is that the
resulting equation is used in the synthesis model outside its
range of applicability. The second danger, is that the
correlation is incorrectly accepted as an independent
variable when it is in fact dependent . (9)
e. A Limited Number of Alternative Subsystems
This requirement is necessary because a synthesis
model is limited to including only those ship subsystems for
which it has estimating relationships. For example, a
combined diesel or gas turbine main propulsion machinery
subroutine may be available but a combined steam and gas
turbine machinery subroutine may not be.
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In addition to giving a specific design solution,
a synthesis model is useful in performing sensitivity
analysis by means of "what if" questions. One can postulate
an improvement at the subsystem level and explore its impact
on requirements at the ship system level.
Figure 3-2 lists some synthesis models, study
projects using them and the number of design iterations
accomplished at NAVSEC over a six year period (1967-1973).
The DD07 model shown in Figure 3-2 has been used in all of
the recent studies of destroyer type ships.
3. Military Effectiveness Model
Another type of model used by NAVSHIPS to investigate
trade-off alternatives is the Military Effectiveness Model,
developed for the Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA) project.
This model uses a mathematical expression to determine military
effectiveness. In order to measure effectiveness, the desired
performance of the equipment or system under consideration
must be defined as precisely as possible. Selection of
parameters to be optimized was based on the following
criteria
:
a. The parameter is significant in performance of
of the basic mission.
b. The parameter has a quantitative value established
by operational requirements.
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d. The value of the parameter can be varied by the
design engineers during preliminary design.
e. The value of the parameter can be determined
during contract design.
In the LHA project, military effectiveness was
determined by considering the number of troop accommodations,
the troop vehicle offload time, preloaded areas, the cargo
delivery rate, the number of helicopter landing spots,
endurance, speed, survivability, reliability, availability,
draft and overhaul cycle to name a few.^-'-O) Each of these
factors was built into a mathematical model, weighted as
appropriate, and then the model was solved using a number of
different iterations varying the value that was under
investigation.
4. Development of Essential System Parameters
A study of the elements that drive the ship design
is fundamental to an examination of their impact during the
development of naval ships. The parameters or parameter
ranges dictated by OPNAV serve as a starting point for the
process of identification of essential system parameters.
Ships were once weight limited; that is, the size of
the hull was determined by the amount of buoyancy needed to
support the total of the component weights. Today, because
of the specification requirements issued by OPNAV, the space
requirements for armament, electronics, and people, rather
than their weights, dictate ship size. Thus, ships are now
volume limited. The ship design engineer exercises more
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control over hull volume than any other parameter he deals
with. The present requirements for items such as habitability
and crew support as well as the importance attached to them
have a large impact on the volume problem. As a result, ship
manning has become an essential design parameter.
The machinery space in a ship is a "large object"
space, i.e., space is determined by specific dimensions of
specific large items of equipment. The volume of the machinery
space is a function of beam, which is generally not determined
by the ship width required to hold the individual pieces of
machinery as they are arranged side by side, but is governed
by stability requirements and hence a function of the position
of the center of gravity. Consequently, stability, propulsion
plant machinery, electrical generation capability and air
conditioning capability are essential design parameters.
5. Change Management
Typically a project office is established after a
ship has been sized and the conceptual design has already
been accomplished. At this time the project manager finds
that his world of trade-offs has been partially constrained.
The user-producer dialogue has been established by this time
and the initial cost and performance trade-offs have been
accomplished by the conceptual design process with the
Program Sponsor working directly with NAVSEC . The emphasis
of the project manager at this stage of the process is to
study the proposed conceptual design and mold it into
specifications which can be used to request bids from industry
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for the detailed design and construction of the ship.
Additional studies will be conducted to insure that all
aspects of the proposed ship characteristics have been
investigated. The project manager will also be evaluating
the impacts of the ship design on a proposed schedule. Thus,
schedule now becomes a full-fledged partner in the trade-off
analysis on an equal basis with performance and cost . The
project manager, through his dialogue with OPNAV, will make
refinements to the ship design, make recommendations for
changes to the requirements which resulted in the conceptual
design, and modify other design aspects as appropriate.
When the construction contract is awarded, the
project is in the acquisition period (Figure 2-1). During
the later parts of this period the trade-off world of the
project manager shifts from one of influencing the design
process to one of balancing performance, cost and schedule
aspects of change proposals, particularily since ship
construction must start before detail design is completed.
In the process of resolving the questions posed by the change
proposals and evaluating their impact on performance, cost,
and schedule, project managers are assisted by a Change
Control Board (CCB), NAVSHIPS Specifications Control Board
(SCB), the Superintendent of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIPS) at the
contractor facility, and other supporting organizations.
The Change Control Board (CCB), when properly
constituted and organized, can be one of the most useful
in-house aids that is available to the project manager to
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assist him in making trade-off decisions on proposed changes
The function of the CCB is to investigate, analyze and
report to the project manager what the change involves, the
alternatives, if any available, the impact on performance,
cost and schedule, and the recommendation of the CCB as to
the best course of action. The usefulness of the CCB is
aided by including in the board's deliberations all
offices which have an interest in the proposed change.
The Specifications Control Board (SCB) reviews
and evaluates the total impact of proposed changes to
specifications. In the course of the construction of his
ship, the project manager may need to modify some particular
ship specifications, in which case he would refer to the
SCB for its analysis of the effect of the change to
accepted specifications. The project manager may also use
the SCB to review for completeness such items as design
data sheets, development work statements or purchase
descriptions issued for the procurement of feasibility
demonstration hardware. Thus, the SCB is a group outside of
his immediate organization that the project manager can turn
to for assistance to aid his decision-making process.
The Superintendent of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIPS) is
the eyes and ears of the project manager at the contractor
site where the ship is being built. SUPSHIPS will receive
the change proposals from the contractor and make an initial
evaluation of the possible impact of the change from his
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viewpoint prior to forwarding them to the project office.
The recommendations of the SUPSHIPS of the impact on
performance, cost and schedule of a proposed change is one





Many techniques are available to the project manager to
help hira maintain a balanced program, by means of cost,
schedule, and performance trade-offs. One of the keys to
designing and constructing, a cost-effective ship is to be
able to determine the effects and interactions of cost,
performance, and schedule as design requirements. Some of
the analysis techniques used in each area are discussed in
this chapter.
A. PERFORMANCE AS A DESIGN REQUIREMENT
Many trade-off options are available to OPNAV as it
specifies the required platform performance parameters. These
trade-offs are often made prior to the initiation of a user-
producer dialogue. Initial studies by the OPNAV analytical
>
supporting organizations and the Naval Ship Engineering
Center (NAVSEC) allows the first round of trade-offs to be
made. As an example, NAVSEC conducted a study that evaluated
the combined gas turbine and steam turbine propulsion plant
as opposed to more conventional propulsion plants such as
steam. This resulted from an interest in possible prime
mover candidates for the guided missile destroyer which is
to carry the Aegis missile system. The study compared the
850 psi steam system, a 30,000 horsepower gas turbine system,
and a combined gas turbine and steam turbine system. Items
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such as weight of machinery and fuel, reliability,
availability, time required to get underway, acceleration
and deceleration, alternate operating modes and risk to the
ship development were all assessed. The study results
provided OPNAV several trade-off options in selection of the
desired propulsion plant. Interactions of ship platform
performance parameters must be investigated fully to
illuminate all of the trade-off options possible so that
OPNAV can make a definitive judgment about what parameters
it desires to hold constant. In the past, several parameters
such as speed, endurance, and length have been fixed, possibly
without total knowledge of their impact, and as a result many
trade-off options were lost to the ship designer.
The impact of performance as a design requirement can be
shown by the following examples:
1 . Speed.
Ship speed and/or steaming profile, the speeds
required by a ship to fulfill its mission, are specified by
OPNAV to the designers because of the probable end use of
the ship. If the ship is to be used as a carrier escort then
it must be capable of carrier speeds. If the ship is a
convoy escort then it must be as fast as the convoy plus an
additional speed capability that will allow it to patrol
around and ahead of the convoy. A replenishment ship must
have sufficient speed to keep up with its task group and to
safely conduct the replenishment operation. It must also be
able to go to some restock point and return to the task group
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as quickly as possible. The speed required of the ship will
normally dictate how many shafts are required as well as
influencing such items as engine horsepower and overall ship
dimensions. Continuing analysis of speed can size and power
a ship design, however many of the other factors discussed
below will also impact speed, size, and power and will
require trade-offs to select the most cost-effective approach.
2. Draft
Draft is also dependent on the proposed mission of
the ship as well as the overall size of the ship. Draft
is critical to the consideration of ship stability, sea keeping
capability, and buoyancy, as well as speed. If a ship will
always operate on the open ocean, then its draft is only
restricted by the necessity of going into port . The super
tankers, for instance, are not draft limited, since no port
is capable of accepting them. If a ship is designed for
coastal interdiction or protection, then its draft is
critical because it must be able to operate in very shallow
waters. Although the mission drives the draft requirement,





The length of a ship is a critical factor considered
along with draft and width (or beam) of a ship to determine
the platform stability. Length restrictions or ranges are
specified to determine how much useful area or volume will be
available in a ship to accommodate all of the systems that
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the ship is required to carry. The length of a ship and its
beam are used to calculate a design parameter known as the
length-to-beam ratio. This ratio shows whether the relation-
ship between length and beam for a particular ship type will
satisfy minimum acceptable standards developed by naval
architects. Tables of length-to-beam ratios versus other
ship design parameters are used for further analysis of
trade-offs. The platform or box shape of the ship, determined
by its length, is one of the key parameters which is used to
cost out a particular type of ship. Once shape has been
determined, cost estimating relationships based on space and
weight can be applied.
4. Endurance
The endurance required of a ship is normally determined
by the mission the ship is to fulfill, and the time it is
expected to be underway. If a ship is expected to operate
with a task group, it can reasonably be expected that
replenishment will be available. However, if a ship is
expected to operate independently for long periods of time,
it must have the endurance designed into it which will allow
this type of operation. Endurance considerations affect the
selection of engine or propulsion type, space required for
fuel, provisions, and spare parts, and ordnance loading.
Probable ship steaming profile has the greatest impact on the
desired endurance. Experience in the past few years has been
to design ships with longer endurances to minimize diversion
from combat and because the fleet is more susceptible to
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attack by an eraeny during replenishment operations, and
with declining fleet assets more missions are accomplished
by lesser numbers of ships in more isolated locations.
As indicated in the four examples above, platform
performance parameters are a critical feature in the ship
design process and trade-offs must be fully investigated.
Chapter III indicated how models can be used to measure the
impact of these parameters on ship design. There are other
techniques available to the project manager which he may
use to measure or quantify performance in the design process.
Some of these techniques are discussed in the next section.
B. PERFORMANCE TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
The following techniques are used by the project manager
and those who assist him in the ship design process. A brief
discussion of each technique is presented. Specific details
of each technique are available from the references listed
in the Bibliography.
1. Performance Analysis
NAVSEC uses a technique of performance analysis
known as PADS, which requires the existence of a design
solution and certain information characterizing this solution
to an existing problem. The procedure used in the performance
analysis and documented in the data sheets can be defined as:
" a way of demonstrating by analysis whether




The purpose of performance analysis is three-fold:
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a. Assessment of Design Adequacy
Design validation or proof that the performance
level supplied by the proposed design solution is equal to
or exceeds the required/specified performance.
b. Trade-off Impact Assessment
Visibility as to what impact certain adjustments
of the proposed design solution would have on performance
(these trade-offs are very likely necessary to settle
incompatabilities between performance requirements and a
cost constraint).
c. Assessment of Optimality
Some indication as to what "price" has been
paid for meeting the performance; this may mean indication
to what degree the design solution exceeds the necessary
performance or where in other areas sacrifices and/or
expenditures have to be made in order to provide the existing
design solution.
In certain cases a clear distinction between
these three items may be very difficult; for example, a
certain degree of optimality or "efficiency" may already be
contained directly or indirectly in the required performance.
In other cases, it may not be easy to define a criterion for
quality or optimality. In still other cases, any trade-off
impact assessment is meaningless because the performance
requirement is mandatory or the item has been specifically
called out as a must have requirement.
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A study of performance analysis for stability and
reserve buoyancy conducted by Hydronautics, Incorporated for
NAVSEC shows the types of items considered by this technique.' '
In the case of reserve buoyancy analysis, it consisted of the
determination of limiting drafts resulting from floodable
length studies, and flooding water levels. The basis for
determination of the extent of flooding is the length of
damage to the shell of the ship at any point along the ship's
length resulting from weapon attack or collision. The ship
designer uses standard floodable-length curves to assist in
establishing transverse bulkhead spacing. In addition for
a given ship arrangement and a set of limiting drafts, it
is possible to determine the final trim line after flooding
of any group of adjacent compartments.
2. Maintenance Engineering Analysis
Maintenance engineering analysis is a tool that can
be used along with life cycle cost analysis to help determine
the reliability and maintainability , requirements of the
system under consideration and the maintenance resources
needed to support the system. An analysis conducted for
the SSN-688 Project Office on the three-inch launcher system
was concerned with: (12)
• Data collection and analysis to obtain the performance
history of similar equipment.
• Development and dissenination of reliability,





• Failure modes and effects analysis to identify
critical components.
• Corrective maintenance analysis to identify corrective
maintenance requirements, support, facilities, and so
forth.
• Preventive maintenance analysis to establish a balanced
scheduled maintenance program.
Collection and analysis of available performance
history of similar components was conducted to facilitate
estimating failure rates for components of the three-inch
launcher system and to identify potential reliability and
maintainability problem areas. The principal source of data
was the Navy's Maintenance Data Collection System (MDCS).
MDCS data on signal ejector system component malfunctions, as
reported by numerous SSN and SSBN Class Submarines, were
reviewed. Additional performance data was obtained from
discussions with operating forces afloat during shipboard
visits to nuclear submarines for the purpose of obtaining
information concerning reliability, maintenance, and
operational problems related to the signal ejector system.
Specific areas discussed were accessibility and maintenance
problems and system components experiencing repetitive
failures. A third source of performance data was the
equipment manufacturers.
During the detail design of the three-inch launcher
system, reliability, maintainability, safety, and human
engineering design criteria were developed and provided to
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the system designers in the form of design criteria
guidelines/checklists, reliability and maintainability
problem reports, and safety hazard reports.
The likelihood and consequences of significant system
failure modes were identified and investigated by means of a
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. The SSN-688 Class
specifications, three-inch launcher system diagrams, detailed
system drawings, and manufacturers' equipment drawings were
utilized in conducting this phase of the analysis. This
identified the failure modes which are likely to be encount-
ered, their criticality, and their resultant effect on the
system and ship.
A Corrective Maintenance Analysis was conducted and
utilized the failure causes for each failure mode contained
in the above failure analysis to establish the maintenance
requirements necessary to effect repair. This analysis
provided estimates of the time required to perform the total
maintenance requirement for each component, the associated
skill level needed, and identified the lowest repair
activity level capable of performing the maintenance action
in question.
The Preventive Maintenance Analysis was conducted to
ensure that a balanced preventive maintenance program was
established for the three-inch launcher system that will
meet the needs of the equipment with a minimum of ship's
resources expended. The analysis identified preventive
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maintenance requirements along with the maintenance level.
skill level, and time required for accomplishment.
In addition, in-depth studies were conducted to
define the design configuration that offered the best
compromise among all design alternatives. Design trade-offs
and special studies were conducted as dictated by the results
of the data research effort and all of the previous analysis
studies. Constant system design monitoring was then instituted
to insure that reliability and maintainability would not be
degraded by design changes.
3 . Technical Performance Measurement
Since it is desirable to provide guidance to assure
that trade-offs are properly made, especially in the perform-
ance area, to quantify the likelihood of meeting or exceeding
performance requirements and to assure that changes in the
likelihood of meeting these requirements can be tracked, a
quantification and tracking process has been devised called
Technical Performance Measurement (TPM).'"-*'
MIL-STD-499 defines Technical Performance Measurement
as: "TPM is the continuing demonstration and prediction of
the degree of actual or anticipated achievement of selected
technical goals or objectives of a system or part thereof,
together with the causal analysis of the variance between
achievement and objective. The purpose of TPM is to permit





The steps in measuring and tracking technical
performance are:
a. Performance Variables
Determine the performance variables essential for
technical success and establish performance functions or
equations which relate performance variables to design
variables. Typical ship performance variables are speed,
range, endurance, and typical design variables are length,
displacement, and installed shaft-horsepower. A typical
ship performance equation would be:
/PC\ 1/3
For speed — V = K x( ] x P
° \pc/ 1/6
LW
where, PC is a propulsive coefficient
DC is a draft coefficient
P is installed shaft-horsepower
LW is length in feet times displacement
in long tons (2240 lb/ton)
K is a constant
o
b. Probability Distributions
Develop subjective probability distributions for
the design variables, by making inquiries of experienced
personnel. This interview technique systematically draws
from past experiences the information necessary to reconstruct
a range of expected design values and the associated
probabilities. This probability distribution could be
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.50 - .55 .3
.55 - .60 .5
.60 - .65 .2
checked for sensitivity to change or probability changes to
measure the effect of the design variables. For example:






Using appropriate techniques, e.g., simulation,
to determine the likelihood of meeting technical objectives
or of obtaining desired performance. For example:
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
CHARACTERISTICS IN A HYPOTHETICAL SHIP DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
V (knots) 16 17 18 19 20
P(V) .15 .2 .45 .1 .1
Range (miles) 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
p(Range) .1 .2 .4 .25 .05
Endurance (hours) 3800 4000 4300 4400 4500
p(Endurance) .25 .35 .2 .1 .1
d. Performance Tracking
Track changes in the likelihood of meeting
performance objectives. This tracking can be by means of
tables or graphs, which show probabilities for a ship
attaining a given speed after construction for different
periods of time, or to track the development of some system
against a time line to determine if schedule will be attained
along with the attainment of the desired performance.
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Technical performance measurement parameters should
be selected for one or more of the following reasons:
mission/task critical; performance critical; state-of-the-art
critical. These are often selected for contractural incentive
parameters. All parameters must be measureable. A mission/
task critical parameter, for example, may be ship speed or
range or endurance, or it may be associated with a subsystem
such as a radar.
C. COST AS A DESIGN PARAMETER
The Department of Defense has stated in Directive 5000.1
that
:
"Cost parameters shall be established which consider
the cost of acquisition and ownership; discrete cost
elements (e.g., unit production cost, operating and
support cost) shall be translated into 'design to'
requirements. System development shall be continuous-
ly evaluated against these requirements with the
same rigor as that applied to technical requirements.
Practical trade-offs shall be made between system
capability, cost and schedule. Traceability of
estimates and costing factors, including those for
economic escalation, shall be maintained. "(13
)
Unit costs of weapon systems have risen to such an
extent and funds available to the Department of Defense have
become so limited that a considerable disparity between
requirements and resources has developed. This was recognized
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when Directive 5000.1 was promulgated. Unit production
costs are a part of life cycle costs and must be considered
as a primary design parameter, but not at the expense of
increased ownership costs or through the sacrifice of
performance essential for mission accomplishment.
As specified in the JOINT DESIGN-TO-COST GUIDE ^ 14 ) the
"Design-to-Cost" concept utilizes unit production cost as
a criterion for project manager decisions and as a design
parameter for engineers. To be really meaningful as a
design parameter, unit production costs must be realistically
established and represent an appropriate value for the item.
"The best possible design to perform the mission must be
obtained for the established unit cost goal," according to
the guide. The guide also states, "The design must be
iterated to obtain the best cost, schedule, and performance
trade-offs within the established thresholds. If redesign
cannot achieve the unit production cost goal, there must be
trade-offs made to reach the maximum performance possible,
at the cost goal, and still assure that a viable weapon
system design is obtained." The intent of the design-to-
cost concept is to design to a unit production cost, i.e.
make unit production cost a design parameter. Design-to-
Cost is based on the application of learning curves to the
production process. Since ships are constructed and not
produced in large quantities, the total ship system does
not lend itself readily to the application of this concept
as true learning curve efficiencies are never achieved. The
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concept of design-to-cost can be utilized for the production
of ship subsystems, however it must be remembered that cost
should be a design variable and not just a design constraint.
Since the "Design-to-Cost" concept has evolved, several
new Navy ship developments, starting with the Patrol Frigate
(PF) program, are being designed to a cost ceiling. In the
PF project, total ship cost was specified as a design con-
straint which would cause performance and schedule to be
traded off within the cost constraint . Only when cost is a
design variable, can a balance be reached between cost,
schedule and performance.
The cost ceiling design procedure differs from the past
practice of designing primarily to operational requirements.
Operational requirements are still the central issue in ship
design, but budget limitations have dictated an approach
other than designing the most capable ship. Currently, and
for the foreseeable future, changes to designed operational
capabilities will be balanced with an eye to their marginal
costs. During design, a significant effort is required to
discover and control changes which would cause the cost of
the ship to grow.
As a ship proceeds through its design phases, the cost
estimates become more accurate because more and more is
known about the ship and its installed systems. The greater
the accuracy of the cost estimate, the easier it is to
evaluate the marginal cost impact of various systems against
the cost ceiling. This provides the ship designer with a
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means of trading off alternative systems or subsystems in the
design process. The major elements of ship acquisition
cost which are used as the basis for ship design cost
iterations are shown in Appendix A.
Ship characteristics and design practices utilized are
limited by the trade-offs required to keep the ship design
within its cost ceiling. Initially, the major system trade-
offs will have a smaller impact on the total cost. During
feasibility studies, the ship design is controlled by gross
characteristics to accomplish the stated goals, and one is
only concerned with total cost being within some designated
cost ballpark. During conceptual design, using more specific
guidance, with respect to certain parameters of the ship,
cost can be determined more closely by considering the
individual incremental costs of changing some of the design
characteristics. As the ship design is further defined, the
specific cost impact of different subsystems and equipments
can be examined to measure their effect on the total ship
cost. Figure 4-1 shows the evolution of a ship cost baseline.
The ship design spiral depicted in Figure 4-2 shows the
process wherein the ship is progressively defined in
increasing detail. The tighter the spiral the more design
definition and more accurate the cost estimation.
1 . Design Cost Estimating and Its Problems
Within NAVSHIPS, cost estimates are provided by
personnel who rely on specific information which describe
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of cost estimating are used, parametric cost estimating and
engineering cost estimating. Parametric cost estimates, the
"top down approach," utilize gross, parametric cost-estimating
relationships to determine the cost of the ship and its
components. This type of cost estimate is most often used
in the conceptual design process when the design of the ship
is in its early stages and firm ship characteristics are
unknown. Engineering cost estimates utilize the "bottoms
up" approach to cost estimating. This approach allows the
engineer and cost analyst to start at the lowest level
possible and estimate the cost of a system or ship from the
smallest component, to equipment, to subsystems, to system
and finally to the ship level itself. In actual practice,
as the design definition becomes more firm the parametric
cost estimate and the engineering cost estimate should meet
somewhere in the middle and their estimates should serve
to check each other to provide the project manager as
accurate a cost estimate as is possible within some
confidence level.
Cost estimating of naval ships encounters problems
which are peculiar to the Navy, few of which are encountered
by commercial shipbuilders. First, Navy ships are signifi-
cantly more complex. For example, the electronics and
ordnance systems are extremely complicated and the integration
of all of the ship systems to make the vessel an effective
fighting unit is very difficult. Even though new design
commercial ships may have a large degree of automation,
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nowhere else in the shipbuilding industry is there a
necessity for the integration of systems to the extent that
exists in Navy ships. Second, Navy ships have extremely
high technical risk due to the requirement to incorporate
a high level of technological advancement to ensure they
are and will remain current as a combatant when they become
operational in the fleet. Third, the projects in the ship
construction appropriation are of extremely long duration.
The length of time required to construct a ship considerably
hampers the cost estimating problem, since the ship budget
must include development costs, the basic construction price,
change order costs, escalation of labor and material costs,
and any other expected cost growth. Predictions of these
costs into the future becomes a very difficult venture.
Some of the other cost estimation problems can be
more easily solved. Specific design input data needs to be
expanded, more detailed information than in the basic seven
weight groups (Appendix A) must be supplied to improve the
estimation process. Since commercial shipyards, like most
business enterprises, use different accounting systems,
construction costs are often difficult to decipher. Some
method must be devised to allow the government to determine
what the actual construction costs will be at a potential
commercial shipbuilder's shipyard.
2. Life Cycle Cost
The Department of Defense Life Cycle Costing Guide
states, "The Life Cycle Cost of a ship is the total cost of
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acquisition and ownership over its useful life. It includes
the cost to the government of development, production,
operation and disposal. The two basic considerations that
influence life cycle cost decisions are cost and effective-
ness. When making a cost-effectiveness analysis, the decision
maker must consider every relevant expenditure that will
have to be made in the future for each alternative, as well
as every future benefit or achieved objective that will
result from each alternative."' '
There obviously is no requirement for a trade-off
if all of the alternatives are equally effective. If the
alternatives are of equal cost, the most effective alterna-
tive is chosen. A trade-off decision is required, however,
when the most effective alternative is not the least costly.
The decision must be made considering whether the additional
effectiveness is worth the higher cost. As the number of
trade-off parameters for each alternative increases, the
determination of preferences between alternatives, each of
which gives one combination of the parameters, escalates
very rapidly in difficulty.
The greatest trade-off flexibility is achieved when
overall system operational requirements are specified. For
example, if the requirement for reliability or maintain-
ability was fixed, mission oriented values for the complete
ship would be preferable to values for the subsystems. The
value for the entire ship would make it easier to respond to
new information and would allow the revision of subsystem
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planning values without requiring a change in the fixed
requirement. Similarly, if requirements could be fixed in
terms of total life cycle cost and effectiveness, instead of
in narrower terms, then the flexibility of continuing




Life Cycle Cost analysis requires the use of models
that are different from most cost models used today in that
they should incorporate operating and suport costs rather
than just acquisition costs. These models are based on
cost estimating relationships. An example of a very simple
cost estimating relationship might be the cost of an item
which is directly related to its weight; that is
C = DW
where C = cost of item in dollars
D = a cost-weight factor in dollars/lb of
weight
W = weight in lbs
It should be remembered that use of the CER depends upon
judgment that the historical data processed into a CER
reflects sufficient commonality with the proposed new item
being costed to give a reasonable estimate of the latter.
As information about the ship design and its use
increases during development, and as decisions committing
larger amounts of money are required, more detailed costing
becomes feasible. Total ship cost may now be broken into
finer details such as hardware, personnel, training, and
facilities. The elements are related through cost equations
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which reflect in detail the way the elements interact when
the ship is developed, produced, operated, and supported.
Other important cost factors include the choice among
alternatives in the following areas: contractual require-
ments, both qualitative and quantitative; hardware and
software designs; proposed product improvement effort;
preventive maintenance programs; corrective maintenance
concepts such as throwaway versus repair of failed items
(and the associated choice of level of repair); personnel;
support systems; operating procedures, and other items that
can influence the life cycle cost and/or effectiveness of
the system.
3. Examples of Cost and Performance Trade-Off
s
^ '
Three examples of cost-performance trade-offs are
shown below. The order of the three trade-offs is from
those which would have a major impact on the design concept
to trade-offs principally affecting selection of a particular
subsystem, with system configuration trade-offs in between.
a. Sea Control Ship (SCS)
This example is taken from the experience of
NAVSEC personnel with the Sea Control Ship (SCS) during
its feasibility design phase. The issues at hand were the
selection of major ship characteristics by means of cost-
capability trade-offs. The ballpark SCS was constrained to
$100 million and 12 aircraft. A ship feasibility baseline
existed at the start of this design phase. Characteristics







































OPNAV wanted more aircraft and less manning. No position
existed for carrying fuel for refueling surface escorts, and
an armament suit had not been decided upon. During the
feasibility design a tentative maximum displacement design
goal of 15,000 tons was established. Trade-off studies were
made leading to decisions on the principal characteristics
shown in Figure 4-3. Two of these trade-offs are discussed
below.
(1). First consider how the number of elevators
affects ship acquisition costs. The baseline ship had two
elevators. Removal of an elevator lessens high weight, the
ship shrinks to keep the same stability and strength,
propulsion power decreases and less auxiliary and electrical
power are required. The three elevator scheme, by virtue
of arrangement space, has a larger cost differential than
the one elevator scheme. Incremental costs of aircraft
elevators are shown in Figure 4-4.
(2). Second, consider the number of aircraft and
percent hangared, and their effect on ship acquisition cost
as shown in Figure 4-5. Operational hangaring in terms of
aircraft capacity, with five being the baseline for the
ship, is to be traded-off. The number of aircraft carried
affects simultaneous air operations and thus the flight
deck size. This is the principal determinant of ship size
in this type of ship.
By this process, in each characteristics issue area,
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with the inherent operational capability of the characteris-
tics to decide on the revised baseline ship. A better
statement of design requirements was developed and the design
constraints of cost and displacement were decided.
b. Electric Power Generation.
Consider the subsystem design concept for the
electric power generating plant of a destroyer type ship.
In this example, the issue is how to meet the power require-
ments of the ship. Costs include the equipments and their
impact on ship design. The design envelope at the time of
this trade-off was a ship which was well over cost ceiling.
Four electric generation cases or alternatives
are shown in Figure 4-6. The configurations signify the
number of diesel generator sets times the nominal capacity
of each generator. Baseline case one, for example, has
four generator sets at 500 KW each for 2000 KW installed.
Certain design standards have been followed as
regards the ship's electric plant. As Navy ships have
generally had lives of up to 30 years and have had major
changes in their weapons and electronics suits at roughly
10 year intervals, a 30 percent growth margin is usually
installed relative to the required load to allow for
increased electrical demand over the life of the ship.
In battle conditions, the electrical plant must carry the
full load with one generator shut down. The growth margin
shown in Figure 4-6 is with one generator shut down and
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design loads at the time of the trade-off were 1310 KW in
battle and 1150 KW in cruise condition. It can be seen
from the figure that cases two and four will satisfy cruise
power with two generator sets off the line. The listed
shipbuilding costs were obtained from a CER developed for
a set of destroyer type ships where the parameter is simply
installed KW.
Reliability analyses were performed for all
four cases; the probability of providing battle and cruise
power was calculated for an eight week period of deployment.
This is the measure of performance effectiveness used for
all cases. Assume that a minimum probability of .87 is
specified under any condition. The issue of cost-effect-
iveness is then displayed in Figure 4-7 for selection of
the configuration alternatives. Note in Figure 4-7 that
case one gives a low probability of meeting the eight weeks
power requirements. Conversely, cases two and four have
high performance, but at a cost penalty. Case three is
the superior choice in terms of reasonable cost for an
acceptable level of performance.
c. Selection of Subsystem Alternatives
In considering the choice among subsystem
alternatives, costs can be grouped into the following
categories; equipment, installation, operating and support
costs, and their impact on the total ship design. Equipment
costs are straightforward, installation costs, and operations
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The general approach develops a set of cost
factors to be applied by subsystem designers in their consid-
eration of the ship cost consequences of selecting a design
concept. The factors are relative to a design baseline, and
they are clearly applicable at the conceptual phase of the
ship design before too many characteristics are fixed, as
well as in later phases. The cost factors illustrated in
Figure 4-8 are the results of assumed independent changes in
manning, electric power requirements, deck space, and weight
on the ship design. These marginal costs are applied to the
appropriate change accompanying subsystem design alternatives
The following comments are appropriate:
(1). The manning factor includes habitability
,
food, stores and air conditioning in addition to the cost of
the man.
(2). The electric power factor is constrained
by the fact that the typical availability of equipment is in
discrete steps of 250 KW.
(3). The space factor is a consideration of
the cost of area or the effect of length and beam on the
ship design.
(4). The weight factor depends on the parameter
D (distance from ship keel). If D = O (weight at the keel),
ship cost decreases because stability driven beam is reduced













D. SCHEDULE AS A TRADE-OFF PARAMETER
Although schedule is of lesser importance in the initial
phases of ship design, it is schedule that starts the
acquisition and schedule, along with cost, which drives the
acquisition in its later phases. All systems and equipments
are programmed to achieve some initial operating capability
(IOC) date. To this end, the consideration of schedule is
an important parameter to the project manager. Schedule is
concerned with the timing of events in the acquisition process,
New subsystem or equipment developments as well as the ship
development must proceed along a planned time schedule to
insure that a viable weapons system is operational in the
fleet at the proper time.
The project manager's concern for time and schedule
cause him to assess each trade-off for its impact on schedule
as well as performance and cost. After contract award,
timing of events becomes critical not only because of
timeliness considerations but because now delays in scheduled
events directly translate to cost. In the later stages of
ship construction, the considerations of cost and schedule
begin to override considerations of performance .
The concern for schedule by the project manager requires
him to use some type of information system which will show
him where he is on his time line and how his ship acquisition
plans are functioning. Schedule tracking systems available
include the much publicized PERT technique, first used in
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the development of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine,
program milestone charts, which indicate the planned date
of accomplishment of key events, technical performance mile-
stone requirements, which can be used to measure a contractor's
progress on key performance parameters of the project, and
PROMAP,^ b ' another computer-based network schedule tracking
system similar to PERT, developed by the School of Engineer-
ing and Applied Science at UCLA from their TRANSIM System
Simulator Model/ 17 )
Trade-off alternatives in the development and construction
of ships must consider the impact on schedule. The control
tools indicated above can assist the project manager in
assessing and measuring trade-off impact on schedule.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the preceeding chapters, the sequence of and
responsibilities for the decision-making process in the
planning and acquisition phases of the ship acquisition life
cycle have been discussed. Some of the techniques and tools
used by Project Managers to assist them in making their cost,
schedule and performance trade-offs have been described.
This chapter presents some of the conclusions resulting
from a review of past actions. Recommendations are made in
several of the areas discussed.
A. AGE OF THE FLEET ANALYSIS
Age of the Fleet Analysis predicts the obsolescence of
current Fleet units. Personnel interviewed at NAVSEC
indicated that insufficient time was available during the
conceptual phase to explore and optimize the conceptual
design solution and to fully investigate the various trade-
offs between cost and performance. The conceptual process
should begin early enough to allow sufficient time to
investigate all viable alternatives, using Age of the Fleet
Analysis, taking into account the estimated time required
for development and construction of follow-on ships. OPNAV
must make the determination sufficiently early that a class
of follow-on ships will be required to meet the existing
need to allow optimization of the conceptual design. The
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dollars expended at this point in the life cycle for such
trade-offs are minor compared to the costs incurred during
development and construction. If the conceptual design
process is begun early during the conceptual phase, changes
to the program, or even program termination, have little
cost impact as compared to the cost of changes required
during development or construction.
B. THREAT AND MISSION ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF MISSION
PROFILES
Threat and mission analysis and the development of
mission profiles is the responsibility of OPNAV. Personnel
within the technical commands indicated that, while OPNAV
was identifying the threat and was presenting some ideas of
what it thought would meet the threat, the development of
mission profiles was being left up to the technical commands,
if done at all. As the representative of the ultimate user
of the product, OPNAV determines the operational use of
the ship and should, therefore, develop complete mission
profiles. By passing this responsibility to the producer,
OPNAV may be allowing the ship designer to develop mission
profiles which support his design instead of having the ship
design support the mission profiles.
C. OPNAV PARAMETER CONSTRAINTS
The broader the requirements criteria are, the more
flexibility is allowed the designer to investigate the effects
of possible trade-offs within the design solution to meet
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operational requirements. In the development of the old
"single sheet characteristics" (now the Top Level Require-
ments), OPNAV must ensure that it does not become too
specific in its requirements, particularly at subsystem and
equipment levels. To achieve maximum trade-off flexibility,
OPNAV should only specify the operational parameters and
allow the design engineer to develop the ship design para-
meters that will satisfy the operational requirements. For
example, when OPNAV determines that the ship must be able
to achieve a certain speed, with gas turbine propulsion and
one screw, it has effectively pre-designed the ship for the
design engineer. He will have the ship sized and powered
before he gets involved in the design process.
D. TOP LEVEL REQUIREMENTS /TOP LEVEL SPECIFICATIONS (TLR/TLS)
The advent of TLR/TLS would appear to provide the user
and the producer a better opportunity to conduct a dialogue
and to weigh the possible alternatives to satisfy a need.
It also should provide a better flow of information between
the user and the producer, thus allowing the inputs of each
to be fully analyzed and lead to a more orderly acquisition
process. The danger in this new procedure is that it could
just become another "paper work exercise" and, therefore,
not accomplish its intended purpose of exchanging ideas and
investigating alternatives before the ship design is
finalized. TLR/TLS should document the orderly flow of
decisions, their causes, and how the final decisions in the
acquisition process were reached.
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E. CURRENT OPERATOR INPUT
1. Conceptual Design
The use of an Ad Hoc Panel to investigate the desir-
able features of ships and submarines and their value in a
real world operational environment has very potential benefits,
This would bring the influence and experience of the current
operator into the acquisition process to assist headquarters
personnel in developing operational requirements as well as
ship characteristics, since the headquarters personnel are
removed from the day to day problems of the operating forces.
This procedure was used in the design of the SSN-688 class
submarine. In this instance, NAVSHIPS assembled a group of
recent commanding officers with a vast amount of at-sea
experience and essentially asked, "What would you want in a
ship which must be able to accomplish these missions?" The
Ad Hoc Panel developed a set of proposed characteristics
which were then tested at NAVSEC for feasibility and cost
impact and aided in the determination of the approved ship
characteristics. The Ad Hoc Panel did have the use of
conceptual studies which had been prepared prior to their
involvement, but in addition, the at-sea experience of these
individuals assisting the ship design personnel proved to be
a successful venture. The use of this type of Ad Hoc Panel





2 . Development and Construction
Many of the decisions that are made within the project
office, as a ship is undergoing development and construction,
are made by personnel who have not had recent experience in
or are not familiar with the operating forces. A possible
lack of knowledge concerning current ship operations could
result in a poor decision with respect to some feature of
ship and equipment design. If, however, a recent operational
line officer is assigned as a member of the project staff,
his experience as an operator can be considered when decisions
are made. As an example, the assignment of a Marine officer
to the LHA project proved to be very valuable to this project
in regard to the cargo handling system with which the Marines
embarked on this ship will be concerned. It is recommended
that appropriate line officers with recent at-sea experience
be assigned to project staffs in order to gain the current
operator's viewpoint.
F. MULTIPLE-FUNCTION SYSTEMS AND SYSTEM INTEGRATION
In the current environment of diminishing resources
available to the Department of Defense, the Navy is forced
to investigate to the greatest extent possible, the fullest
utilization of its systems and equipments, for example,
being able to use waste heat from a gas turbine engine to
fire a boiler, or being able to use an equipment's cooling
water to also satisfy air conditioning requirements.
Multiple-function systems fully utilize the resources
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available and maximize their benefits. To achieve such
benefits, a total system design approach should be initiated
during conceptual design. Allowing the design engineer
adequate time to complete the conceptual design process helps
to insure that all multiple-function systems and system-
integration alternatives are fully investigated and reduces
the cost impact of re-design during development or construc-
tion in order to take advantage of multiple-function uses.
G. TESTING AND INTEGRATION
Since it is unlikely that there would be a "sail off"
between competitive prototype ships, as presently done with
airplanes, prototyping must be relegated to the subsystem
level. Where feasible, prototyping at the subsystem level
should be accomplished during all phases of development. If
satisfactory test data can be obtained from experimental
models instead of relying on "paper studies," less risk may
be involved in proceeding from development to construction.
All subsystems can be prototyped at some level. The use of
prototypes allows the risk inherent in system integration, a
problem which has caused serious difficulties for the Navy
in the recent past, to be reduced. It has been the tendency
to separately test and evaluate subsystems or components
during the construction of ships, however the integration of
these systems while being tested has been lacking. It is
apparent that more test and evaluation time is required when
complex systems must be integrated. The use of land based
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test sites is one tool which allows system integration risk
to be reduced. This type of test and evaluation is mandatory
for systems which are just completing development. The
integration of components within one system and each system
with other related systems is a vital link in the ship
construction phase. If it is impractical for a system or
subsystem to be completely prototyped as a hardware model
due to cost or time factors, the use of a combination of
hardware components supported by simulation, in a land based
test site, can prove beneficial.
H. FLEXIBILITY OF HULL FORMS
The Navy should encourage the development of ship plat-
forms which are capable of performing different functions by
growth or change, as opposed 'to developing one ship to solve
one need and additional ships to solve other needs. The
Surface Effects Ship (SES) hull type, among others, is a
development that has the potential for being able to fulfill
many types of different missions from a small partol craft
to an aircraft carrier. To point its development toward
satisfying a specific mission would reduce the potential
effectiveness of this hull form and its possibility of being
used for different and diverse purposes. The DD-963 class
destroyer design encompassed the growth part of this approach,
Trade-offs were made to ensure that the hull was capable of
withstanding substantial growth during future modernization,
if it became desirable to change the primary mission. This
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aircraft carrier escort capable anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
platform has the potential for conversion to an anti-air
warfare (AAW) combatant during modernization at a later stage
in its life cycle. In order to take advantage of potential
economies, new hull structures should be designed such that
they can be converted to satisfy other mission purposes at
a future time. Once a specific need is determined for a
particular type of hull structure and its use is encompassed
in a new program, the basic hull concept should remain in
the research and development stage to investigate other
possible uses.
I. IN-HOUSE DESIGN CAPABILITY
The advent of using performance specifications in which
a contractor is given certain performance thresholds he must
meet could degrade the Navy's capability to accomplish in-
house detailed ship design and full-scale development. It
appears that there will always be a need for an in-house
capability to accomplish conceptual design work, but the
detailed design requirements are now being performed by
commercial contractors. As a consequence of reliance on
contractor accomplishment of detailed ship design, Navy ship-
yards are losing their capability to design and construct
new ships. With the recent difficulties experienced in
obtaining commercial shipbuilder interest in construction of
small quantities of specialized ships such as tenders, it
is readily conceivable that the Navy will be required to
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design and construct these ships in house using Navy ship-
yards. It is easier to hire experienced shipyard trade
craftsmen, such as welders and pipefitters, than to find
experienced detail design engineers who are capable of fully
designing ships. It is also necessary to be able to retain
the in-house expertise required to evaluate a potential
contractor's new ship proposal. In addition, experienced
detail design engineers are required to allow the Navy to do
a better job of writing performance specifications, so that
there can be a clear understanding of what the performance
thresholds entail.
J. STATE-OF-THE-ART VERSUS DEVELOPMENTAL RISK
Due to the length of the development and construction
phases of a ship and its subsystems, proposals for new
improved equipments or subsystems which are being or can be
developed must be considered. Weight must be given to the
impact on performance, cost, and schedule for the total
system should the developmental equipment or subsystem not
be available when required. This risk must be weighed
against the probable obsolescence of the state-of-the-art
subsystem the developmental subsystem would replace. Using
a subsystem that cannot adequately meet the need is no better
than failing to develop a new subsystem when required. It
may be better to reserve space and weight within a new ship
and have the developmental subsystem installed at a later
date, rather than pay for a subsystem that has marginal
94

benefit and will require substantial updating or replacement
in the near future. The more self-contained a developmental
subsystem is, the easier will be the integration problem if
it is installed after delivery of the ship. It is conceiv-
able that a subsystem could be developed as a self-sufficient
entity with items such as its own power supply and stabili-
zation source. The additional cost could be offset by
increased flexibility, less integration design and material
costs, and lower requirements for other shipboard equipment
which would otherwise be required to provide sources for the
new subsystem.
K. UPDATING OF THE NAVSHIPS' COST MODEL
The data input based in the cost model which is presently
used by NAVSHIPS is updated annually, upon the completion of
new systems, or the input of significant new data from ship
construction activities. The cost model data must be updated
to allow the prediction of resources required to produce the
end product. A specific cost estimate for a ship can be
significantly influenced and changed after each updating.
The reason for the change results from the cost model
unrealistically projecting, in today's economy, certain cost
growth categories such as escalation.
The model projects the current limit of 4£ percent
allowed by the Department of Defense for escalation. Another
problem with the model is that it bases its labor and
material costs on the Department of Labor indices. While
95

this is the best source of information available, it is
based on all industrial users of a commodity, not just the
shipbuilding industry. In addition, due to geographical
location, costs to one shipbuilder for material and labor
are not the same as the costs to another shipbuilder. If
the Program Manager is using the model to estimate the cost
per unit of his class of ships and is working under a produce
to cost ceiling, the updating of the model's data base can
have a significant impact on his trade-off alternatives.
Even after the ship design is basically frozen, a data
update can require the Program Manager to trade-off perform-
ance or schedule in order to reduce cost. While there is no
question that the model data base should be updated in order
to accurately predict budget requirements, the impact of the
updating on a specific program's cost ceiling must be
evaluated. It is necessary for the cost estimators and
program managers to work together to determine the causes of
cost growth in a program as a result of updating.
L. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF DISCOUNTING AND ESCALATION
In the ship cost estimation process used today, discount-
ing is seldom included and, as indicated above, escalation
is considered at an unrealistically low level. While this
may generate from political considerations, if the Navy is
to truly attempt to predict the cost of acquiring and operat-
ing a ship, the effect of these cost factors must be investi-
gated. At the very least, ship cost, estimates should be
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tested for sensitivity to various levels of escalation and
discount rates. The most realistic manner in which to
measure the least expensive alternative, when alternatives
entail different levels of cost over different periods of
time in the life cycle, is to compare their discounted values
after the costs have been escalated. While the time when
resources will be required cannot be predicted for all factors,
those which can be reasonably predicted should be considered
to aid in the selection of the least expensive alternative.
M. ACQUISITION COST VERSUS OWNERSHIP COST
When a program manager is faced with two alternatives,
one of which has a smaller acquisition cost, a greater support
and operations cost, and a greater total cost, in today's
procurement environment the program manager choses the
alternative with the lower acquisition cost. This can lead
to a dichotomy between the design-to-cost concept, where the
program manager is constrained by an acquisition cost ceiling,
and the life cycle cost concept where he is supposed to
minimize life cycle costs. This problem is created because
of the method used to budget and appropriate funds for ship
construction. Instead of fully funding the total program,
it is funded on a year to year basis. The goal then becomes
one of minimizing the year to year resource requirements
rather than minimizing total program cost. Since operations
and support costs are not included in the Ship Construction
Budget, the tendency is not to place sufficient weight on
97

their impact. When any cost analysis for a system is
accomplished, the cost of operations and support must be
given equal consideration with the cost of acquisition.
N. PROJECT CONTINUITY
Because of the length of time involved, and as desirable
as it might be, no one individual will be assigned as a
project manager for ship construction from conception to
delivery of the final unit. However, there are several
points in the life of a project where a change of project
manager can be made with maximum continuity, for example, at
the transition from conceptual to the development phase and
from the development to the production phase. In the recent
past, attempts have been made to relieve project managers
at these points and this practice should be continued. As
a result of the rotation of the project manager as well as
other military members of the project staff. It is essential
that the civilian membership of the project staff maintain
project continuity. The civilian staff members, by virtue
of their long tenure, therefore have knowledge of the
rationale for various program changes and trade-offs made
either through participation or by first hand awareness. In
addition, through participation in the contract evaluation
process, they become aware of the agreements and commitments
made between the contractor and the government. This becomes
of great importance in the later stages of contract completion,
when questions arise pertaining to certain contract provisions.
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Past experience has shown that turnover of the project
personnel on the part of the Navy and contractor has raised
questions in regard to contract requirements.
0. FALL BACK POSITIONS
In dealing with any subsystem that involves an area of
risk in its development, there should be a fall back state-
of-the-art subsystem that can be installed for critical
subsystems if the development should be delayed for a signif-
icant period or fail altogether. If a fall back equipment
is to be considered, there must be adequate provision to
insure that it will be available when required. Eventually
some point in time is reached when the added cost of continu-
ing the new development while also maintaining the fall back
position must be evaluated. At this time, a decision must
be made either to drop the fall back positon because the
risk in development of the new subsystem has been reduced to
an acceptable level, or to drop the developmental subsystem
because the cost, schedule, and/or performance risk of its
continued development is unacceptable. Another aspect of
this type of analysis is to consider when to replace a
subsystem of lesser performance capability by one of greater
capability that has just completed development.
P. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
The Navy is challenged in the courts each year for a
variety of contract claims. The tendency for the contractors
to try to receive compensation in the courts has caused some
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unfortunate and possibly bad side effects. The threat of
litigation to a current shipbuilding program could tend to
reduce the willingness of the program manager to make benefi-
cial changes in the program which result from trade-offs made
during construction. The availability of the latest service
approved subsystem, or the change to a new capability, such
as the Close-in Weapons System (CIWS), could make the change
very desirable, but an inability to sat isf actor ly negotiate
changes with the contractor could delay the delivery date of
the new subsystem to the Fleet.
Q. USE OF POST-SHIPYARD AND TENDER AVAILABILITIES
In the process of shipbuilding, particularly toward the
end of construction, there can be many minor contract changes
or items which require some correction. Our experience from
interviewing personnel on project staffs indicated that very
little consideration is given to the cost impact of having
these items installed during the post-shipyard availability
(PSA) instead of modifying the contract to have the contractor
accomplish the change or correction. As an example, in the
DD-963 project, the small arms locker was going to be modified
as a result of a change to the ship's small arms allowance.
There was, however, some doubt as to what mix of small arms
would constitute the final allowance. In this case, a small
change to the locker specifications would be required, which
would easily be within the capability of a tender or support-
ing base. The question then arises whether the Navy could
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conserve funds by having the locker modification accomplished
after ship delivery. More analysis needs to be accomplished
in the consideration of the cost-effectiveness of having
minor changes accomplished by the contractor or during PSA
or first tender availability after delivery. In this way,
the contractor is faced with competition when requested to
submit a bid for the change. He is somewhat curtailed in
taking advantage of his sole source situation. Should the
contractor not be achieving what he considers a reasonable
profit, he could inflate the cost of these late program
changes. For example, the aircraft catapult blast deflector
for the current nuclear aircraft carrier construction was
inadequate to meet the F-14 fighter requirements. After
analysing the bids of the contractor and the PSA shipyard,
the change was postponed until PSA where it could be
accomplished at less cost. The possibility of obtaining
bid competition for required changes in ship construction
programs should always be investigated. There must be
consideration given to the trade-off of reduced cost versus
schedule delay.
R. FLEET INTRODUCTION TEAM (FIT) CONCEPT
One of the newest concepts to be used in the shipbuilding
process started with the DD-963 program. This FIT concept,
which involves a permanent command of experienced officers
and enlisted men based at the building yard acts as the
nucleus crew for the entire class of ships being constructed.
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Consequently, crews ordered to new ships will report as a
unit only two weeks prior to the ship's commissioning. The
FIT monitors the final ship construction and prepares all
shipboard administrative documents and operational doctrines/
procedures, other than those prepared by the contractor and
the Navy Department. In addition, they train ship's crews
upon their arrival and during the post-delivery period prior
to commencement of shakedown training. Thus, the crew can
devote the majority of their time to learning their ship
without having to concern themselves with the myriad of time
consuming, pre-commissioning administrative details. This
concept has several advantages. It reduces the cost of
forming and training the pre-commissioning crew by delaying
the time that it must be formed, provides allowance for more
initial training time, provides standardization in the ship
acceptance process, in that each crew will not be able to
tailor the last minute changes to the way they would like
to see the ship, and requires less personnel for test and
check-out of ship systems since the FIT is fully capable of
overseeing the entire process. The FIT concept appears to
be applicable to any shipbuilding program where more than a




S. SHIP ACQUISITION LESSONS LEARNED
It appears that there is not a continuing effort by
project offices to document lessons learned during the process
of each ship acquisition program. While each project is
different, many basic problems continue to arise and apply
to the majority of the acquisitions. In order that they
may benefit from the past, new program managers should and
must be aware of previous problem areas. It is recommended
that lessons learned be documented by project offices and
maintained by NAVSEA. In this manner, new program managers
can receive an insight into recurring problem areas. Efforts
can then be directed toward reducing those problem areas




ELEMENTS OF SHIP ACQUISITION COST
1. Ship Design Inputs
These items give the basic ship cost. (Figure A-l)
a. Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) may or may
not be part of groups 2, 3, 5, and 6. Contractor Furnished
Equipment (CFE) is included.
b. Most equipment in groups 4 and 7 are GFE or
come from other Systems Commands, and thus are not cost inputs
here but are later on (i.e., under equipment inputs).
c. The cost elements represent labor and material
to construct the ship, to buy the CFE and to install CFE and
GFE.
2. Business Inputs
These items reflect engineering and construction
services furnished by the shipbuilder in the course of ship
construction, and his profit. The shipbuilder's workload
and his identity clearly affect these costs. Groups 8 and
9 are not the only shipbuilder individualities but it is





This groups a number of other costs funded by the
shipbuilding appropriation. The cost elements include:
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Figure A - 1
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a. Training of the first crew, training materials,
and schools for the crew.
b. Systems engineering, including logistics support.
c. Detail design for working drawings, principally
charged to the lead ship.
d. Escalation in costs during the actual construction
period.
e. Changes in ship design during construction.
f. Test and evaluation, nominally of the lead ship.
g. Stock spares.
h. Government engineering support.
4 . Equipment Cost Inputs
This cost area comes from the Systems Commands which
support the ship project office (hardcore GFE costs) and
includes a reserve for changes in ship characteristics
during the construction period as a consequence of refine-
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